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carefully done, and will be of great value as a source of material as well as for the theoretical discussions it contains.

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Schellings philosophische System. Von EDUARD VON HARTMANN. Leipzig, H. Haacke, 1897.—pp. xii, 224.

The philosophical tendencies of the present age are toward absorption in psychological, ethical, and epistemological, to the neglect of metaphysical problems. In view of this fact, the author thinks that an exposition of Schelling's system is especially needed. The first chapter, on "Schelling's Philosophy in Relation to his Predecessors and Contemporaries," is of less value than most of the others. It consists chiefly of the discussion of Schelling's criticisms of other thinkers. Although the influence of these philosophers upon him is sometimes brought out incidentally, there is no systematic attempt to trace it and determine its effects. Throughout the book, in fact, although there are references to Fichte, Spinoza, and Böhme, the evident purpose is to expound Schelling's system rather than to determine its relation to other systems. The method of exposition, however, is chosen with a view to showing the development of Schelling's thought, and particularly the essential unity underlying the differences between its earlier and later stages. Von Hartmann divides Schelling's work into two main periods: (1) the period of "pure rationalism and pure pantheism" (1794-1806); (2) the period in which he tried "to supplement the rationalism by a higher empiricism" and "to deepen the pantheism by a speculative theism." Each period is subdivided into stages.

The second chapter treats of the intellectual intuition. Schelling has the merit of having shown clearly that the only method by which philosophy can attain apodictic certainty is *philosophical construction*, i.e., intellectual intuition. A careful study shows, however, that it is impossible to fulfil the necessary conditions of the intellectual intuition, and that consequently it can never be "a method of scientific cognition." In the chapter on Schelling's epistemology, the point which receives most emphasis is the gradual change from transcendental idealism to transcendental realism. From the epistemological point of view, Schelling started out as an idealist. The difficulties which he encountered, however, in trying to form a coherent theory of the world, difficulties to which the later Neo-Kantians resolutely closed their eyes, caused him to pass over unconsciously to epistemological transcendental realism. He was unaware of the transition because he still remained true to his metaphysical idealism. In the second period his metaphysical idealistic principle was no longer supreme: on the same plane with it, he placed his realistic principle, connecting the two in the concept of a higher unity. And this change in his metaphysical view made him aware of the transformation that had long ago taken place in his epistemology. In this gradual change of Schelling's view we have a type of the epistemological development of German philosophy.

The chapter on the *Prinzipienlehre* is especially suggestive. Von Hartmann distinguishes three stages in the development of the doctrine. (1) In the first half of the first period, the principles are represented as activities. (2) In the *Identitätsphilosophie*, the absolute is no longer an undifferentiated activity, but a pure, unmoved identity. Hence, the principles cease to be regarded as constitutive factors in the development of the individual self-consciousness, and become mere moments of the absolute. Schelling struggles against this abstract monism, but it is the logical conclusion from his premises. (3) In the second period, the principles appear as powers. The word *Potenz* is used by Schelling in two senses: (*a*) *potentiality*, and (*b*) *stage of development*. In the first period, the principles are sometimes represented as powers in the second signification. In the second period, the two meanings are united. The great difficulty in the doctrine in the second period arises from Schelling's attempt to change the ideal opposition of A^1 and A^2 into a real opposition, by attributing Will to the Idea and potential knowledge to Will. The last two chapters of the book treat respectively of the *Naturphilosophie* and the *Geistesphilosophie*. One of the greatest needs of our time is a metaphysics of nature, and on this account Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* deserves far more consideration than it usually receives. Starting with Fichte's view of nature as merely the product of the Ego and as having no reality of its own, Schelling passed unconsciously to the view of Leibniz, according to which all nature is *Ichheit*. Unfortunately, however, the development of his philosophy of nature belongs to the period in which he held the first position; in the second period, when he might have had a *real* nature, his interest was all in *Geistesphilosophie*. Schelling's doctrines of individuation and the *Urmensch*, and his attempts to find a justification, on his premises, for the existence of the world, are subjected to rigid criticism. His efforts throughout the second period to establish the reality of freedom, immortality, and a personal God are useful, the author thinks, chiefly as evidence of the futility of such attempts. The real value of his later work is not in his ethics and philosophy of religion, but in his epistemology, methodology, and doctrine of principles. If we attend to these really important elements in his later thought, the essential likeness of the first and second periods becomes apparent.

This book will be a most useful addition to our expositions of Schelling's philosophy. The treatment is sympathetic and at the same time discriminating; the efforts to clear away the difficulties arising from Schelling's "vieldeutige" and "schwankende Terminologie" are commendable, and in the main successful; while the criticisms are characterized by the acuteness which one expects from the author. The chief defect of the book is that in his fondness for detailed examination the author often fails to generalize his objections. A little more synthesis would be welcome, not merely because it would save the reader some labor, but also because, for lack of it, one is sometimes in doubt as to the author's precise meaning. Whether

von Hartmann is altogether successful in his attempt to show the unity of Schelling's system, may be doubted by some readers. Certainly his arguments would be more convincing if they were more explicit ; here again one feels the lack of generalized statement.

ELLEN BLISS TALBOT.

The following books have also been received :

The Secret of Hegel. By J. HUTCHISON STIRLING, LL.D. New Edition, carefully revised. Edinburgh, Oliver & Boyd ; New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1898.—pp. lxiii, 751.

The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic. By W. LUTOSLAWSKI. London and New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1897.—pp. xviii, 547.

Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Construction. By S. H. MELLONE. Edinburgh and London, Blackwood & Sons, 1897.—pp. xxii, 426.

Practical Ethics. By HENRY SIDGWICK. London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1898.—pp. vi, 260.

The Works of Friedrich Nietzsche. Edited by A. TILLE. Vol. X, A Genealogy of Morals, translated by W. A. HAUSEMANN ; Poems, translated by J. GRAY. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1897.—pp. xix, 289.

The Teaching of Morality. By SOPHIE BRYANT, D.Sc. London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co.; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1897.—pp. vii, 146.

Practical Idealism. By W. DEWITT HYDE. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1897.—pp. xi, 335.

The Social Mind and Education. By S. E. VINCENT. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1897.—pp. ix, 155.

Citizenship and Salvation. By A. H. LLOYD. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1897.—pp. 142.

The Study of Children and their School Training. By F. WARNER, M.D. (Lond.). New York, The Macmillan Co., 1897.—pp. xix, 264.

The Psychology of Suggestion. By B. SIDIS, Ph.D. With an Introduction by WILLIAM JAMES. New York, Appleton & Co., 1898.—pp. x, 386.

Two Lectures on Theism. By ANDREW SETH, LL.D. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897.—pp. 64.

Problems in the Psychology of Reading. By Dr. J. O. QUANTZ. Monograph Supplement of *The Psychological Review*. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1897.—pp. 51.

On Orthogenesis. By TH. EIMER. Chicago, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1898.—pp. 56.